Abstract:
Introduction
This paper investigates money and inflation in the Kingdom of Bahrain with a focus on the period of the Arab Spring (AS), 2011-13, to determine the effects of social unrest on general and relative prices. The amount of research on the economies of the Middle East and the Arab world has expanded lately, especially in light of the AS. In addition to our own work on the effect of the AS on employment and output in Bahrain (Miller & Epstein, 2015) , researchers have recently investigated the effects of unrest in the Middle East in general on stocks (e.g. Abdelbaki, 2013; Chau, Deesomak & Wung, 2014; Bouri, 2013) , banking (e.g. Jackowicz & Kowalewski, 2013; Kim, 2013; Thalassinos et al., 2013) , unemployment (Campante & Chor, 2012) , and output (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2013) . The issues of money and monetary policy in Bahrain have been addressed by Jusof, Al Wosabi & Majid (2009), Darrat and Al-Sowaidi (2009) , Espinoza and Prasad (2012) , Hojjat & Barnhorst (2013) . Narrowing the focus to the connection between unrest and prices, Dube & Vargas (2013) is representative of analyzes that consider the unrest provoked by price movements. In this paper we reverse the analysis and consider what changes in general or relative price might have occurred as a result of the unrest. To do so we have organized the paper as follows. We begin by investigating the measurement and co-movement of two inflation indicators -the GDP Deflator and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) -over the period 1990-2011, followed by an analysis of the specific movements in the two indexes to determine what nonmonetary factors may play a role in the movement of general prices both over time and in short periods of uncertainty in Bahrain. Third, we look at disaggregated monthly CPI data just before and then during the AS to determine the effect on prices in various consumer sectors of Bahrain, if any, of the onset of social upheaval. The last part sets out our conclusions.
The Nature and Movement of Inflation Indicators over Time
To understand the movement of prices during the Arab Spring we must first determine exactly what the two dominant inflation indexes are capturing. Once done we can then track the movement of the two before and during the AS to discover any causal connection between prices and social unrest. Given these two descriptions we must determine which indicator, if either, truly measures inflation over this 22-year period. Then we can speculate on why the other does not and why it might better be thought of as capturing the cost of living. To make this determination we will use the quantity theory of money relationship between changes in general prices, P, the levels of real GDP (y), nominal GDP (Py), and the velocity of money, V. The results are clear for both money stock indicators. The rate of inflation implied by the behaviour of money, velocity and output much more closely tracks the deflator than it does the CPI, and the difference from the CPI is substantial. While both the deflator and the CPI are computed using standard price index methods the amount of price movement reported over time in the CPI is so small relative to the behaviour of money that we suspect that retail prices may not permitted to move. This divergence leads us to conclude that we must make an important distinction between these two indexes -only one is capturing the level of inflation while the other is capturing instead the cost of living. Insights on this distinction in terms of U.S. data appear in a series of blog posts on the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta website (Bryan, 2014) . The notion of inflation is one of a sustained upward movement in the general price level, shared by most components of the index, and related to growth of money vis-à-vis the growth of real GDP over time. In short, inflation over time is a monetary phenomenon. The cost of living to Bryan "is a description of how difficult it is to buy a particular level of well-being" (Bryan, 2014, Part 2) . The movement in prices is consistent with Bryan's dichotomy, thus we conclude that the deflator is a valid representation of inflation in Bahrain and the CPI must be capturing instead the cost of living.
MV = Py
To further solidify this dichotomy we looked for any practice of price setting and subsidization by the government. While the practices are not readily available on the CIO website we were able to communicate with a staff member at the CIO to get the following list of commodities that either have their price set by the government or the government subsidizes the commodities in whole or in part:
 Consumer petrol  One brand each, set price per kilogram, of chicken, fresh/chilled beef, and fresh/chilled goat meat (other brands not controlled)  Electricity, water and gas  Medicinal drugs, with prices revised every six months  Wheat flour  Health and education services provided to citizens at no charge These items are components of four of the divisions of the CPI consumer market basket, dampening the inflationary effects on 53.75% of the total market basket. In every case the government attempts to keep prices stable, reducing the swings in the cost of living that could occur due to inflationary or deflationary pressures. The swings in prices can be aggravated not only by monetary developments within Bahrain but also by the changing value of the US dollar to which the Bahraini dinar is pegged. Considering how little the CPI is rising over time the government has been successful in shielding consumers from the price shocks that can come from changes in the trade-weighted value of the dinar/dollar and in oil prices. To establish the role played by the dollar, energy prices and the various consumer sectors in price movements we can further analyze the deflator and the CPI before and during the social unrest.
The Behaviour of Inflation and the Cost of Living during the Arab Spring
To determine if general prices were affected in an unusual way during the Arab Spring we must first set out the movement of the price indexes in the years before for which we have comparable data along with the movements from 2011-13. To compare the deflator to the CPI requires that we use quarterly data only given that the deflator is reported solely with the quarterly non-annualized GDP figures. We computed a quarterly CPI using monthly data which we track for percent change in the headline index from the start of one quarter to the start of the next. The finding above that the two major indexes of prices are not correlated also prompted us to determine in what ways the two are dissimilar -they are likely different in both magnitude and in the sign for quarterly values as well. Both present us with interesting macroeconomic expectations.
The movement in the absolute size of the indexes in short-run periods may be associated with exogenous events in the economy rather than monetary policy, given that the relationship between money and inflation holds over time only and not necessarily in any one short-run period. If the two indexes differ in magnitude then we know that something other than monetary factors may explain the movement. Given that the government intervenes to stabilize prices for consumers, any large swing in the deflator not accompanied by the CPI tells us, again, that an exogenous event is likely in play. The time series quarterly price data in 4 Combine this with major swings in the value of the U.S. dollar, to which the Bahraini dinar is pegged, and we have two exogenous factors that could explain the swings. We would expect that changes in oil prices should be positively correlated with the movement in the deflator, and changes in the trade weighted value of the dollar should be inversely correlated with the deflator. 5 The expectation is borne out in the quarterly data from 2007 to 2013. One, the correlation coefficient between quarter-over-quarter (Q/Q) changes in the deflator and Q/Q changes in Brent oil prices is 0.87; the correlation between Q/Q changes in the trade-weighted value of the dollar and Q/Q changes in the deflator is -0.61. Not surprisingly, the movement in the value of the dollar and Brent oil prices is a solid -0.71. All of this, point to the role, at least in the short run, of exogenous shocks in the price of oil and the value of the US dollar in explaining the swings in inflation in Bahrain.
When we get to the Arab Spring in the first quarter of 2011 the divergence is both in magnitude and sign once again between the CPI and the deflator. Our initial expectation, given the behaviour in the 2008-09 period, would be to focus on the dollar and oil. What we actually find, however, is unlike the previous period. The importance of the unrest is revealed in the following set of observations. First, we find that the change in the trade-weighted value of the dollar was minimal. The value of the dollar between 2010Q4 (72.9440) and 2011Q2 (69.5299) dropped a relatively small 4.6%. At the same time the market price for Brent crude oil rose substantially, moving 35% higher between the fourth quarter of 2010 and the second quarter of 2011. Even West Texas Intermediate rose by 20% in the same period. 4 Were we to look instead at Brent oil prices on a weekly basis the drop from the first week of July to the last week of December 2008 was an astounding 74.9%. 5 For an analysis of the connection between oil prices and real exchange rates of oil exporters see Al-mulali & Che Sab, 2012.
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Given the small movement in the dollar's value plus the normally high correlation between oil and the dollar we would expect little change in Brent crude. As a result there should be little change in the deflator in Bahrain. But oil rose while the dollar remained stable. We conclude that a random shock is likely behind this odd movement in oil prices, one unrelated to the value of the dollar. That shock is likely the Arab Spring: the unrest unsettled Middle East energy markets, and energy prices in general, so highly correlated with the inflation index in Bahrain, rose as a result of a price premium for political uncertainty. What is also interesting in this period is the movement in cost of living as measured by the CPI, which was so tame in the period leading up to the unrest. The total change in consumer prices from January 2009 through December 2010 was 2.5%, yet consumer prices fell in the first quarter of 2011 by 2.7%, the largest swing positive or negative in any one quarter for which we have monthly data. Yet, overall price increases for consumers totalled 5.6% from January 2011 to December 2013. Again, the unusual movement must be tied to some exogenous shock, which we would argue was the Arab Spring. But where in the economy was this effect most felt by the citizens?
To establish exactly how the unrest affected the cost of living we can look at the movement of the components of the consumer basket of goods. In August 2007 the CIO began to publish monthly figures on CPI. Initially only headline rates were reported but starting in January 2009 the reports were expanded to include details on a consistent set of categories from the market basket (see Appendix III for the categories). While the time series is not as long as we would need to carry out a sophisticated analysis of unusual behaviour during the Arab Spring, we can consider the movement of the headline rate and of the components to establish the primary side effects of the unrest. An analysis of the components over time allow us to track a change in the relative price of the components as well as pinpoint which components were most affected, if any, by the start of unrest.
To isolate the possible causes of the movement in the cost of living around the time of the AS we first find which components of the market basket moved the most, both up and down. We do this two ways. In columns one and two of Table 3 we list the largest overall price changes in absolute terms regardless of the weight of the sector in the market basket for the period of unrest (February 2011 to December 2013). In columns three and four we list the largest movers adjusted for weight in the market basket as a percent of the total rise in prices over the period of 5.6%. Looking at both methods we see that those sectors showing the biggest absolute or relative changes in prices have movements that are consistent with the prices being influenced by policy makers as much or more than by scarcity or market conditions, save one (housing). Let us focus on recreation, communication, furnishings and food. Recreation prices show the biggest spike in absolute price, but 27.2 percentage points of the 31.4 percentage point rise, or 87% of the rise, occurred in one month between September and October 2011. The same is true of To further establish that pricing policy is behind these movements rather than scarcity and market conditions let us analyze the food sector a little more closely.
To do this we will compare the movement in food prices in Bahrain to the movement in world food prices on an annual basis as reported by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. We would expect food prices in Bahrain to be highly correlated with world prices given how little food Bahrain itself produces; only 1.79% of the land in Bahrain is arable. The country is at the mercy of import prices. Yet, food price movements appear to be uneven and unrelated to world prices. The rise in food prices between January and February 2012 was 8.2%, explaining 95% of the rise over the two-year period of the AS. Over the entire period for which we have data, 2009-13, we see that the movement in food prices in Bahrain is not related to movement in world prices, as shown in Table 4 . This unusual behavior, both within Bahrain and relative to world prices, leads us to conclude that movements in food and other major components of the cost of living must be tied to pricing policy rather than relative scarcity.
There is one sector, however, where this is not the case, and that is housing. Four facts will point to the importance of the onset of unrest in influencing housing prices in Bahrain. One, the change in the housing price index from January 2009 to December 2013 was -7.5%. Two, in the two years prior to the AS the change in the price index was only -1.5%. Three, the change in the housing index between February 2011 and December 2013 was -6.1%. And three, the change in the housing index from February 2011, the exact start of the unrest, to March 2011 was -14.2%, from an index of 107.9 to 92.6. These price movements lead us to conclude that the most important price effect of the Arab Spring on the Bahraini economy was in housing. The price of housing fell due to the onset of unrest and more than three years later (October 2014) prices had not yet recovered.
Conclusion
The effects of the Arab Spring on the economies of the Middle East had the potential to be both varied and widespread. While earlier research has shown that the unrest did in fact drive down GDP and employment growth in Bahrain we analyzed what effect the upheaval had on general and relative prices. We began by investigating the measurement and co-movement of two inflation indicators -the GDP Deflator and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) -over the period 1990-2011. This analysis makes clear that the deflator alone measures inflation in Bahrain; the CPI appears to be instead a measure of the cost of living where prices are influenced by government intervention. The next step was to look at the specific movements in the two indexes to determine what non-monetary factors may play a role in the movement of general prices both over time and in short periods of uncertainty in Bahrain. The evidence points to the important roles played by the price of oil and the trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar. Third, to establish what effects the unrest might have had we looked at disaggregated monthly CPI data just before and then during the AS to determine the effect on prices in various consumer sectors of Bahrain, if any, of the onset of social upheaval. While the onset of unrest is correlated with movements in several components of the CPI index, the AS had its most direct and lasting causal effect solely on the housing portion of the consumer basket. Other prices in Bahrain at the consumer level appear to be greatly influenced by government policy as much or more by market conditions or growth rates in money, consistent with the observation that the CPI is a measure of the cost of living only, not a measure of inflation. Components of the GDP Deflator Agriculture: Output is deflated using volume index and Intermediate consumption at constant prices is calculated using fixed coefficient to the output.
Fishing: Single deflation is used. Output is deflated using volume index and Intermediate consumption at constant prices is calculated using fixed coefficient to the output.
Mining: The estimates at constant prices are obtained through double deflation using volume indicators of production to deflate output at current prices, and a multi index of input prices to deflate intermediate consumption.
Quarrying: The estimates at constant prices are obtained through double deflation using volume indicators of production to deflate output, and an index of construction input materials to deflate the intermediate consumption.
Manufacturing:: The estimates at constant prices are obtained through double and single deflation using appropriate volume and price indices (International price indices for industry for world wild) for different manufacturing activities.
Electricity: Single deflation is used, gross output is extrapolated using a volume index of production and intermediate consumption is taken as a fixed ratio to the output. Water supply: Single deflation is used, gross output is extrapolated using a volume index of production and intermediate consumption is taken as a fixed ratio to the output. Construction: The constant price estimates are obtained through double deflation using the construction cost index (which is a combination of the construction material index and the labor cost index). The intermediate consumption is deflated using the construction material index.
Wholesale and Retail Trade: To obtain the estimates at constant prices the gross output in the various activities is deflated using appropriate price indices, and intermediate consumption is deflated using the overall CPI Hotels: The constant price estimates are obtained through double deflation using a room charges index (from the tourism statistics) for deflating gross output, and a CPI to deflate intermediate consumption. Producers of Government Services: The constant price estimates are obtained through deflation using wage index and appropriate sub-indices of the CPI to deflate the intermediate consumption.
Education: The constant price estimate for the private sector is obtained through double deflation using the volume index for output and a appropriate CPI for intermediate consumption. For the government estimates are obtained through deflation using wage index and appropriate sub-indices of the CPI to deflate the intermediate consumption.
Health: The constant price estimate for the private sector is obtained through double deflation using the volume index for output and an appropriate CPI for intermediate consumption.
For the government estimates are obtained through deflation using wage index and appropriate sub-indices of the CPI to deflate the intermediate consumption.
Other services: The constant price estimates are obtained through deflation using an appropriate CPI.
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